MISSOURI UNDERINSURED OPINIONS MIXED ON ISSUE OF STACKING
In the case of Long v. Shelter Insurance Company, the Missouri Western District Court of Appeals, held that Shelter Insurance's anti-stacking language in the underinsured motorist coverage was ambiguous because of the "other insurance" clause. The court concluded that Shelter's "excess" language in the "other insurance" clause as well as it's "other insurance in the company" provision created ambiguity when read with the policy's anti-stacking language. The court further went on to strike down the policy set off provision, holding that the interplay of the policy's declaration page, limits of liability, and its promise to pay uncompensated damages created ambiguity when viewed against the policy's set-off language.
Interestingly, on the same day the court also issued the opinion of Stewart v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company holding in that case that the insured could not stack and that the UIM anti-stacking language was not ambiguous. In its decision, the court distinguished between the "excess" "other insurance" language in the Liberty Mutual policy from the "other insurance" provisions considered by the Missouri Supreme Court in Ritchie v. Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 307 S.W.3d 132 (Mo. banc 2009). In its decision, the Western District relied on a decision which had already been partially repudiated by the Missouri Supreme Court. That decision, Farm Bureau Town & Country Insurance Company of Missouri v. Barker, 150 S.W.3d 103 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004), was noted by the Supreme Court to have not been cited in any other underinsured motorist decision since it was handed down, and to the extent it was inconsistent with Seeck v. Geico General Insurance Company, 212 S.W.3d 129 (Mo. banc 2000), Barker should no longer be followed. In a detailed decision, the Stewart court, relying on Barker, distinguished the excess provision from other provisions addressed in Ritchie and Seeck. The Missouri Supreme Court did not accept transfer of the case. However, given Ritchie's criticism of Barker, and the Western District's reliance on Barker, this issue almost certainly will be revisited in other cases. The Seeck case, which the Supreme Court cited with approval, relied on a long line of cases including Zemelman v. Equity Mutual Insurance Company, 935 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Goza v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, 972 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Insurance Company of Missouri, 992 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999); American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Ragsdale, 213 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) and Chamness v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 226 S.W.3d 1999 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007), which included similar language to the policy contained in Stewart, but reached opposite conclusions of Barker. Undoubtedly, insurers seeking to avoid underinsured motorist liability will avoid the language held to be ambiguous in Long v. Shelter Insurance Company, and move towards the language held not to be ambiguous in Stewart v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company in the future. Nonetheless, given the inconsistencies between the Stewart court's reliance on the Barker decision and its stark contrast with Seeck and its cases, the underinsured motorist stacking issue will continue to spawn numerous cases, and seemingly conflicting decisions.



