The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio has held that a policy clause which provided that a claim is made when the insured receives information which "could reasonably be expected to result in a claim" is ambiguous. Professionals Direct Ins. Co. v. Wiles, Boyle, Burkholder & Bringardner Co., LPA, 2009 WL 4281263 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2009). The court also held that notice of the claim, provided shortly after the claim was made but after the expiration of the original policy period, was timely where the same insurer provided coverage in both policy periods and the notice was provided within a reasonable amount of time.
The case arose from a malpractice claim which resulted in a large verdict against the insured. The insurer tried to deny coverage claiming that the insured had knowledge which would have allowed reporting the claim in the 2004 policy period but the claim was not reported until the 2004 policy period. The court found the reasonably expected language ambiguous because a reasonable insured would not think a claim likely to a related appeal was resolved.
In an action by an insurer seeking a declaration that it was not liable under a professional liability insurance policy for the acts of a psychologist who treated a victim of sexual abuse but failed to report the abuse, summary judgment for insurer is reversed where the "knowingly wrongful" exclusion in the policy on which the order was based was ambiguous. The court noted that in order for an act to be intentional for purposes of Missouri tort law as well as of exclusionary clauses in liability insurance policies . . . the actor must desire
to cause the consequences of the act, or the consequences must be substantially certain
to result." the court conclude the knowingly wrongful act exclusion was reasonably subject to different interpretations. The court noted that to entertain a contrary view would work an exclusion from coverage of many, if not most, claims for damages arising out of the negligence of insureds and thus defeat the primary purpose for which liability insurance coverage is purchased.
A long-term disability (LTD) policyholder's breach of contract and bad faith claims against his insurer were preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the statute of limitations, a panel of the 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals ruled Dec. 30, upholding a trial court's grant of summary judgment to the insurer (Stuart S. Johnson v. Unum Provident, et al., No. 09-13687, 11th Cir.; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28697).
"Premium" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as a "sum paid or agreed to be paid by an assured to the underwriter as the consideration for the insurance." 1344 (4th ed. 1968). In Missouri the term "premium" was considered in Fidelity Security Life Ins. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue as "consideration paid by an insured to an insurer for a contract of insurance." 32 S.W.3d 527, 531 (Mo. banc 2000) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1181 (6th ed. 1990); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1789 (1981)). In Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Scheufler, the term "premium received" is not "only those portions of the premiums received which are retained for (or used in) the company's business." 180 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. 1944) (emphasis in original). So "premium" means the consideration paid by an insured to an insurer for a contract of insurance. In other words premium is just a fancy way of saying the money paid for the promise of an insurance company.
A federal judge in Connecticut on Jan. 5 held that the follow-the-fortunes doctrine does not apply to losses not covered by an underlying policy (Arrowood Surplus Lines Insurance Company formerly known as Royal Surplus Lines Insurance Company as successor in interest to Connecticut Specialty Insurance Company v. Westport Insurance Corporation formerly known as Employers Reinsurance Corporation, No. 08-cv-01393, D. Conn.; 2010 U.S. LEXIS 426).